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1 Introduction
It is a well-established fact that rmsentry has a pro-cyclical behavior.1 Similarly, the range of
available products exhibits a pro-cyclical pattern (Broda andWeinstein, 2010). Yet, standard models
of imperfect competition à la Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) have assumed that the number of rms
and the range of products are exogenously given. Early attempts to allow for a variable number of
rms, including Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) among others,
have the unappealing consequence of implying a positive relation between the number of rms and
markups which is at odds with the data (Colciago and Etro (2010)). The reason is the (frictionless)
free entry condition in these models requiring zero prots in every period. When the degree of market
power increases, a rm will face higher prots for given entry costs and therefore a strong incentive
to enter the market.2 This needs not be the case as long as markups are allowed to vary over the
cycle. The purpose of this paper is to do exactly this, providing a model with both endogenous
entry and endogenous markups.
Drawing on recent developments in DSGE modelling, I consider a closed economy with monopo-
listic competition where producers are subject to a sunk entry cost, a one-period production lag and
an exogenous exit shock.3 The economy features complete nancial markets and nominal rigidity
à la Calvo (1983). Simulations show that the model matches the synchronization of markups and
entry observed in the data while at the same time reproducing empirically plausible moments for
macroeconomic variables. Sticky prices are essential for these results.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model and discusses
the solution strategy. Section 2 illustrates the performance of the model in reproducing the dynamics
in the data and contains conclusive remarks.
2 The economy
I consider a closed economy version of the model in Cavallari (2011). The economy is populated by a
continuum of agents of unit mass indexed by i. Firms are monopolistic competitors, each producing
a di¤erent variety j 2 (0; N), where N is the number of rms.
A typical agent supplies Lt hours of work each period for the nominal wage Wt and maximizes
1For the US, the cyclical properties of entry have been documented by Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), Dunne et
al. (1998) and Campbell (1997). More recently, see also Jaymovich and Floetotto (2008), Bilbiee et al. (2012) and
Lewis (2009).
2This incentive reduces when entry entry costs are positively related with market power (Chang and Lai (2012)).
3A non-exhaustive list of contributions includes: Bilbiee et al. (2007, 2012), Ghironi and Mélitz (2005), Bergin
and Corsetti (2008) and Cavallari (2007, 2010).
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Producers face an identical linear technology in the labor input yt(j) = ZtLt(j), where Z is an
aggregate shock to labor productivity. In order to start the production in period t + 1, at time t a
rm needs to purchase fe units of the consumption basket at the price PC : Others, as Bilbiie et al.
(2012) and Cavallari (2007), model entry in e¤ective labor units fe = L. Entry costs in this case
coincide with labor marginal costs.
As in Ghironi and Mélitz (2005), all rms entered in a given period are able to produce in all
subsequent periods until they are hit by a death shock, which occurs with a constant probability
 2 (0; 1) : In each period, in addition to incumbent rms there is a nite mass of entrants, Ne:
Entrants are forward looking and decide to start a new rm whenever its real value, , given by the
present discounted value of the expected stream of prots fdsg1s=t+1, covers entry costs:
t = Et
" 1X
s=t+1
 (1  )

Cs+1
Cs
 
ds
#
= fe (1)
The free entry condition holds as long as the mass of entrants in positive. Macroeconomic shocks are
assumed to be small enough for this condition to hold in every period. Note that upon entry, rms
prots vary and can even turn negative for a while. This is a key di¤erence relative to early models
of frictionless entry, where prots are zero in every period. The timing of entry and the one-period
production lag imply the following law of motion for producers:
Nt = (1  ) (Nt 1 +Ne;t 1) (2)
Finally, I assume complete nancial markets. Agents can invest their wealth in a set of nominal
state-contingent bonds, B; that span all the states of nature. In addition to bonds, they hold a share
s of a well-diversied portfolio of rms. The budget constraint of a typical agent i is given by:
X


qt(
t+1)
Bit
PCt
+ st (Nt +Ne;t) vt  Bit 1
PCt
+ st 1 (vt + dt) +
WtLit
PCt
  Cit (3)
where q is the bond price.
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2.1 Equilibrium conditions
2.1.1 Consumers
Consumersrst order conditions are given by:
qt (st+1)
PCt
(Ct)
  = Et

Ct+1
PCt+1
 
(4)
(Ct)
  =  (1  )Et

dt+1 + vt+1
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(Ct+1)
 

(5)
Ct(j) =

Pt(j)
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 
Ct (6)
Wt
PCt
=  (Lt)
1
' (Ct)
 (7)
2.1.2 Firms
Each producer sets the price for its own variety facing market demand yt(j) =

Pt(j)
PCt
 
(Ct +
feNe;t): I introduce nominal rigidities through a Calvo-type contract. In each period a rm can set
a new price with a xed probability 1  which is the same for all rms, both incumbent rms and
new entrants, and is independent of the time elapsed since the last price change. In every period
there will therefore be a share  of rms whose prices are pre-determined.4
Each rm sets the price for its own variety so as to maximize the present discounted value of
future prots, taking into account market demand and the probability that she might not be able
to change the price in the future, yielding:
Pt(j) =

   1
Et
1P
k=0
( (1  ))k Wt+k
Zt+k
yt+k(j)
PCt+kC
 
t+k
Et
1P
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(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PCt+kC
 
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The above expression can be re-arranged in a more familiar form as:
Pt(j) =

   1 (1   (1  ))
Wt
Zt
+  (1  )EtPt+1(j) (9)
Clearly, when  = 0 optimal pricing implies a constant markup 
 1 on marginal costs at all dates.
4The simplifying assumption that entrants behave like incumbent rms is without loss of generality. Allowing
entrants to make their rst price-setting decision in an optimal way would have only second order e¤ects in my setup
with Calvo pricing.
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With  > 0, prices respond less than proportionally to a marginal cost shock, implying a decline in
markups.
Aggregating (9) across rms yields the state equation for the producer price index, PPI:
(Pt)
1  = 
Nt
Nt 1
(Pt 1)
1  + (1  )Nt (Pt(j))1  (10)
2.1.3 Aggregate constraints
Dene real GDP as Y  R N
0
P (j)
PC
y(j)dj. Goods market clearing requires output to equalize aggregate
demand, Yt = Ct +Ne;tfe: Labor market clearing implies:
Lt 
Z 1
0
Litdi 
Z Nt
0
yt(j)
Zt
dj (11)
The model is closed by specifying a monetary policy rule. I assume the monetary instrument
is the one-period risk-free nominal interest rate, it, and monetary policy belongs to the class of
feedback rules.
2.2 The log-linearization
The model does not provide a closed-form solution. It is log-linearized around a symmetric steady
state with zero ination. In the steady state, stochastic shocks are muted at all dates, Zt = 1.
The Euler equation for bond holdings is given by:
Et bCt+1 = bCt + 1

bit   Ett+1 (12)
where a hat over a variable denotes the logdeviation from the steady state, t+1 = lnPt+1=Pt is
producer ination and E is the expectation operator. In (12), an increase in the real interest rate
raises the return on bonds, therefore making it more attractive to postpone consumption in the
future.
The Euler equation for share holdings is:
Et bCt+1 = bCt + bt + 1

Et

i+ 
1 + i
dt+1 +
1  
1 + i
bt+1
Consider the optimal price (8). Using market demand and (7), re-arranging and linearizing gives:
Et
1X
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'
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'
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'
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where bPt;t+k = lnPt(j)=Pt+k . Note that by denition bPt;t+k = bPt;t  kP
s=1
t+s; namely changes in the
real price of a variety over time are given by the variety e¤ect, the rst addend, less ination. Using
(10), the variety e¤ect is:
bPt;t = 
1  t +
1
(1  )(   1)
bNt   
(1  )(   1)
bNt 1
With  = 0; an increase in the number of producers raises the real price of each variety and the
more so the lower the elasticity of substitution . This e¤ect is dampened with  > 0: Combining
the two equations above and re-arranging gives the new-Keynesian Phillips curve (corrected for rm
entry):
t = 

+
1
'
 bCt   1
(1  ) (   1)
bNt   (1 + ')
'
Zt +

(1  ) (   1)
bNt 1
+ (1  )EtHt+1 (13)
where  = (1 (1 ))(1 )
('+)
:
A log-linear approximation to the number of entrants is obtained from the aggregate resource
constraint: bNe;t =  (1   (1  ))

bYt + 1   (1   (1  ))

 bCt (14)
Note that there is a trade-o¤ between investments in new varieties and consumption of existing
goods (the coe¢ cient on C is negative). The law of motion of rms is:
bNt = (1  ) bNt 1 +  bNe;t 1 (15)
Using the property that the aggregate price markup   R N
0
P (j)
W=Z
dj coincides with the inverse
of the labor share, Y P
C
WL
, one can substitute away the real wage in (7) and together with the GDP
denition obtain an expression for aggregate labor. In log-linear terms, this gives :
bLt =  ' bCt + ' bZt   bt + bPt;t (16)
where bt =  (1  ) bPt;t+1   bPt;t + Ett+1 :
Finally, monetary policy follows a Taylor rule bit = ibit 1 + t with interest rate smoothing.
5 For ease of comparisons with exible price models, I also consider a Wicksellian regime in which
5Taylor rules are empirically plausible, especially in the last few decades when the objective of price stability has
gained a major role in monetary policy-making. Interest rate smoothing accounts for the need to reduce swings in
6
the nominal interest rate is set so as to reproduce a exible price equilibrium with zero ination.
The Wicksellian interest rates is eit = Et bCt+1   bCt ; i.e. it mimics changes in the natural (real)
interest rate. As is well-known, the Wicksellian policy can be implemented recurring to a credible
threat to deviate from a zero ination target, i.e. it =eit + #t with # > 1.
3 Simulations and conclusions
The model is simulated using rst-order perturbation methods. In line with real business cycle
models, I consider productivity shocks as the main source of business cycle volatility, abstracting
from interest rate innovations.
3.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated on the United States. In the simulations, periods are interpreted as quarters
and  = 0:99 as is usual in quarterly models of the business cycle. The size of the exogenous exit
shock  is 0:025 as suggested by Bilbiie et al. (2007). The rate of rm disappearance is consistent
with a 10 percent rate of job destruction per year as found in the US. The elasticity of substitution
across varieties  is equal to 7:88 as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). This yields a reasonable
average markup of approximately 18 percent. Studies based on disaggregated data usually nd a
much lower ; roughly around 4. Simulations with a lower elasticity deliver qualitatively identical
results and will not be reported. Other preference parameters are ' = 2:13 as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999) and  = 1 as in Bilbiie et al. (2007). I have also experimented with a full range of
admissible values for  and '; obtaining similar results (not reported).
Galì et al. (2001) estimate a value for the degree of nominal rigidity between 0:407 and 0:66 in
the US. I take the middle point from this interval and set  = 0:49, implying an average duration
of nominal contracts of 2.3 quarters.
The vector of productivity shocks Zt follows a univariate autoregressive process with persistence
0:975 and standard deviation of innovations 0:0072 as in King and Rebelo (1999). The parameters
of the Taylor rule draw on Bilbiee et al. (2007), i = 0:8i
J
t 1 and i = 0:3. Finally, as xed costs do
not a¤ect the dynamics of the model I set fe = 1 without loss of generality.
interest rates in an environment characterized by long and variable lags in monetary transmission.
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3.2 Moments
In comparing the model to properties of the data, the treatment of variety e¤ects deserves a particular
attention. As argued in Ghironi and Mélitz (2005), empirical relevant variables - as opposed to
welfare-consistent variables - net out the e¤ects of changes in the range of available products. The
reason is the inability of statistical measures of CPI ination to adjust for availability of new products
as in the welfare-consistent price index. Hence, the data are closer to the producer than to the
consumer price index. In what follows, any variable that in the model is measured in units of
consumption is deated by producer ination and converted into units of output (for any variable
X in consumption units the corrected measure will be XRt = P
C
t Xt=Pt).
Table 1 reports statistics of the models articial time series together with statistics in US data.
As with the data, statistics refer to Hodrey-Prescott ltered variables with smoothing parameter
of 1600: The reported statistics are averages across 100 simulations. The rst column refers to the
benchmark model, the second column to the variant with labor entry costs, the third column to the
exible price economy and the last column reports US data from Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).6
Table 1:
Benchmark model Labor entry costs Flex price model US data
X=Y XY X X=Y XY X X=Y XY X X=Y XY X
C 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.96 1.16 0.98 0.92 0.77 0.86 0.99
L 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.52 0.71 0.06 -0.87 0.98 1.10 0.88 0.90
NRe 2.95 0.74 0.78 2.35 0.98 0.94 0.39 0.68 0.83 2.99 0.87 0.87
 0.59 -0.97 0.92 0.81 -0.92 0.86 0 0 0 0.60 -0.28 0.79
X is the standard deviation of variab le X, XY is the correlation of variab le X w ith output, Y , and X is the auto-correlation of variab le X .
The benchmark model matches the volatility and persistence observed in the data fairly well.7 It
also replicates the positive comovement of consumption, employment and investment with output as
well as the negative comovement of markups. Markups, however, are far more counter-cyclical than
in the data. These results are robust to specifying entry costs in units of labor. In the exible price
6In the variant with labor entry costs, the log-linear model is as before except for the following equations:
bt = 1
'
bLt +  bCt   bZtbYt = bZt + bLt + bPt;t
7Entry behaves similarly to investments (Lewis, 1999). In US data, the correlation between output and net entry
measured as Net Business Formation is 0.71. The standard deviation of NBF relative to that of output is 2.19.
8
economy, on the contrary, the performance of the model deteriorates. The volatility of employment
and investments is too low compared to the data while that of consumption is too high. This is a
consequence of a strong incentive to smooth labor e¤ort over time so long as real wages are relatively
stable (in equation (9) with  = 0 nominal wages and prices move in unison). Clearly, the exible
price economy also fails to capture the dynamics of markups.
The reason why markups and entry are negatively correlated (as in the data) is easy to grasp.
The favorable business conditions attract new entrants in the economy, translating into a gradual
increase in the number of producers over time (see equation (15)). This in turn pushes on labor
demand, raising wages and marginal costs. With sticky prices, the price of each variety will adjust
only gradually, thereby implying a decline in rmsmarkups.
In line with Bilbiie et al (2012), my ndings suggest that rm entry may help reduce the distance
between theoretical predictions and business cycle facts. In this paper, I have shown that sticky
prices are essential for capturing the synchronization of entry and markups observed in the data.
Clearly, this is only a rst step towards a model that incorporates other relevant aspects of rms
demography, from endogenous exit to the duration of a rms life. This is ground for future research.
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